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Abstract 
Negotiations between the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) states on the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) began in 2002. The EPAs 
are intended to replace the most recent form of partnership framed by the Lomé 
convention, as it was seen to infringe the rules of the WTO. This study examines trade 
and fiscal implications of the EPA between the EU and the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS). It compares and discusses the evidence from empirical 
studies trying to assess these effects. In addition, it examines how West African countries 
prior to the EPA are preparing for the necessary transition of their fiscal regimes. 
 
The main conclusions drawn from the study are the following: the EPA will imply 
significant revenue losses for West African countries and divert trade from extra- and 
intra-regional suppliers in favour of EU suppliers. It is doubtful whether these countries 
will be able to compensate entirely for losses in tariff revenue by reforming their fiscal 
systems. In order to truly profit from the dynamic gains from an EPA, West African 
countries will need financial and technical assistance provided by the EU. The EPA may 
not deepen regional integration nor promote South-South trade. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The partnership between the European Union (EU) and the former European colonies, the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries dates back to 1963 when the first 
Yaoundé Convention was signed. Its major objective was to promote economic growth 
and development which the EU tried to achieve by offering preferential access to the 
European market for ACP countries. Since this was seen as discriminative against other 
developing countries, as well as incompatible with principles of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), a need for a new partnership was necessary. 
 
The Cotonou agreement sets the framework for a new trade regime under the European 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs); these are founded on reciprocal trading agreements 
where European producers will gain an almost unrestricted access to the ACP markets. 
The negotiations on EPAs, which commenced in 2002, have raised serious concerns 
amongst ACP countries about the consequences of implementing the agreements. Firstly, 
developing countries rely heavily on trade taxes as a source of revenue, and losses in 
tariff revenue as a result of liberalisation may be so large that they cannot be 
compensated for by other means. Secondly, ACP countries fear that their domestic 
industries would face severe competition, undermining their development, and that 
agricultural production would be challenged by competition from subsidised European 
commodities. 
 
The EPA negotiations were due to be concluded at the end of 2007 in time for the 
expiration of the Cotonou preferences. However, the negotiations have proved to be more 
complicated to conclude than what was expected. At the time of writing only one region, 
the Caribbean, has signed an EPA. 
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1.2 Purpose of the Study and Delimitations  
The purpose of this study is to discuss the trade and fiscal implications for West African 
countries as a result of the EPA between the EU and the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS). The West African region has been chosen as it is one of the 
poorest regions in the world and can be expected to be hit harder than any of the other 
ACP regions by potential negative impacts of the EPA. It is also the region where the 
EPAs have faced the most outspoken political resistance. 
 
This study will give an account of the likely trade and fiscal effects of the EPA between 
the ECOWAS and the EU by comparing and discussing the evidence from empirical 
studies trying to assess these effects. In addition, it examines how West African countries 
prior to the EPA are preparing for the necessary transition of their fiscal regimes.  
 
This paper does not attempt to empirically estimate the impacts of an EPA on ECOWAS 
member countries but to present a coherent picture of earlier research and literature on 
the subject, as well as address some of the issues in the negotiations from a political 
economy perspective. The study focuses on trade and fiscal effects; it does not explore in 
depth the broader positive effects that can be expected from deepening integration and 
development assistance. Neither does it consider the subject of liberalisation of services 
or the so called “Singapore issues” – investment, competition, trade facilitation, and 
procurement 
 
1.3 Outlining the Paper 
The paper is structured as follows: The following section reviews the ACP-EU 
partnership over time as well as the design and the WTO-compatibility of the EPAs. 
Section three describes the economic framework for assessing impacts of the EPAs on 
ACP countries. Next, section four reviews in detail the EPA negotiations between the EU 
and the ECOWAS. Section five presents and discusses empirical studies analysing the 
likely impact of the EPA on individual West African countries. Finally, section six draws 
conclusions. 
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2. EPA – History and Content 
The first EPA negotiations were launched in Brussels in 2002. EPAs were proposed in an 
attempt to replace the previous non-reciprocal preferences that were granted to the ACP 
countries under the previous Yaoundé and Lomé I-IV Conventions. This section 
describes the evolution of the partnership between the EU and the ACP countries from 
Yaoundé to the EPA negotiations of today. 
 
2.1 From Yaoundé to Cotonou 
Two Yaoundé conventions initially established the EU-ACP partnership, the first of 
which was signed in 1963 between the European Economic Community (EEC) and 
former European colonies (Karingi et al., 2005, pp. 8). They provided financial and social 
support measures through the European Development Fund (EDF) and offered reciprocal 
and non-discriminatory trade preferences. In 1975 the first Lomé convention, replacing 
the previous regimes, was signed. These trade preferences were based on preferential 
access for ACP countries to the EU market whereas the same concessions did not have to 
be extended to European exporters in return. The concept behind Lomé was for 
developing countries to be given the potential to expand their industrial base whilst 
enjoying protected markets. 
 
In hindsight, the objectives of Lomé were not successfully reached as most ACP 
countries did not enjoy the expected levels of economic growth (Karingi et al., 2005, pp. 
8). In total the Lomé convention was renewed four times during its lifespan, until 2000 
when the EU was granted the last waiver at the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha. 
The poor economic performance of the ACP countries can be partly explained by 
restricted access to major export markets but to a larger extent by factors such as a 
turbulent political environment, ill-governed institutions, low levels of education, a fast 
growing population and an unfavourable climate. Another impediment facing ACP 
exporters was the restrictiveness of the rules of origin used to certify that the goods being 
exported to the EU originated from the free trade area (FTA). 
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In the mid-90’s the EU began to acknowledge the need for a new partnership agreement 
(Karingi et al., 2005, pp. 8). In addition to the unsuccessful achievement of the growth 
and development objectives of the Lomé Conventions, these unilateral agreements were 
seen as incompatible with international trading rules, i.e. Article XXIV of the General 
Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as discussed in the next section. Moreover ACP 
countries felt that the current partnership was based on conditionality rather than 
reciprocity and that aid could be suspended in the case that European standards in areas 
such as human rights, democracy or legal institutions were not met. It has also been 
suggested that the EU were keen to secure its market access in the regions since actors 
like China and the US were becoming increasingly dominant on the world market scene. 
 
The successor of the Lomé Conventions, the Cotonou Agreement, was signed in 2000 for 
a period of 20 years (Fontagné et al., 2008, pp. 37). It offers a framework for negotiating 
trade agreements replacing the Lomé partnership with six EPAs. Apart from concluding a 
WTO-compatible partnership, it focuses on strengthening political dimensions such as 
good governance and respect for human rights; moreover it aims to integrate ACP 
countries into the world economy, eradicate poverty, deepen regional integration among 
ACP countries and provide more constructive development aid assistance. According to 
the last waiver granted by the WTO, the preferential access to EU markets that ACP 
countries enjoyed under Lomé would not extend any further than the 31 December 2007 
and was due to be phased out during 2008. However, in the autumn of 2008 it was clear 
that the majority of the EPAs would not be signed in time (see next section for discussion 
of the consequences). The only ACP region to have signed a complete EPA at the time of 
writing is the Caribbean (EC, 2009). 
 
The EPA negotiations are conducted in parallel with the 78 ACP countries1 divided into 6 
regional groupings: West Africa, Central Africa, Eastern and Southern Africa, Southern 
Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (see Appendix 1). These are not separate regional 
integration areas but consist of overlapping free trade areas, customs unions and non-
                                                  
1 The ACP countries Cuba and Somalia will not sign an EPA; East Timor and Equatorial Guinea have 
observer statuses in the negotiations. 
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associated countries. The division was made since larger regional units are more capable 
of providing measures enhancing growth, of offering competitive goods and services and 
also for the purpose of facilitating the dialogue (Hinkle et al. p. 268). For political and 
historical reasons, most African countries belong to two or more regional integration 
areas, thus explaining the melting-pot of regional associations (Fontagné et al, 2008, 
p.14). Only six of the 53 African countries belong to one, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo for example is a member of four. This obviously poses a challenge to the 
negotiations but could also be an important factor in enhancing cooperation between the 
different regional associations. 
 
2.2 EPAs and the WTO 
One of the main issues with the previous regimes was, as discussed earlier, that they were 
not WTO-compatible. According to the most favoured nation (MFN) principle of the 
WTO, any trade concession granted to a trading partner should be extended to all other 
WTO-members. There are two exceptions for which this basic principle can be 
disregarded. Firstly, under the enabling clause, preferences can be granted to developing 
countries provided that they are offered to all developing countries or strictly to the least 
developed countries (LDCs). Schemes such as the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative 
and the General System of Preferences (GSP) are examples of preferences granted under 
the enabling clause.  
 
Secondly, article XXIV of the GATT stipulates that the MFN principle can be set aside 
when it comes to free trade agreements between member countries or regional groupings. 
The logic behind this exemption is that free trade agreements between trading partners 
are seen as beneficial to the global economy as a whole. An EPA between the EU and a 
group of ACP countries would fall under article XXIV. The requirement for such an 
agreement to be WTO-compatible is that “substantially all the trade” be liberalised (Art. 
XXIV par. 8b) and that liberalisation takes place “within a reasonable length of time” 
(Art. XXIV par. 5c). The definitions of these two phrases are disputable but the European 
Commission offers some guidelines by suggesting that 90 percent of all bilateral trade 
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should be liberalised in order for a preferential trade agreement (PTA) to be 
WTO-compatible (Fontagné et al., 2008, p.38). This would allow ACP countries to 
maintain protection for some sectors that are particularly sensitive to liberalisation. For 
ACP countries on average, 90 percent of bilateral trade volumes would imply 
liberalisation of around 80 percent of imports; although at the regional level trade 
balances with the EU differ. For instance, in the case of ECOWAS, 21 percent of imports 
could potentially be excluded from liberalisation, whereas the Pacific which exports a lot 
more to the EU than it imports could exclude up to 42 percent of its imports. On the 
matter of implementation, according to the “Understanding of the Interpretation of 
Article XXIV of the GATT 1994”, par. 3, “a reasonable length of time” should be 
understood as ten years except under special circumstances. Thus any interim agreement 
concluded in 2008 should not extend any further than 2018 without a granted 
dispensation. 
 
Since only one region, the Caribbean, had signed a complete EPA in the due time, it was 
seen as necessary to conclude interim agreements with regions or individual countries in 
order to secure their market access (EC, 2009a). Some countries have signed neither of 
the available agreements and will continue to benefit from EBA preferences if they are 
LDCs or, in the case of non-LDCs, from the GSP scheme. For the latter group, the GSP 
scheme provides less favourable treatment than under the Cotonou preferences, since 
they are available for all developing countries. The impact would be most severe for the 
Caribbean, the Pacific and the Eastern and Southern Africa who would face significantly 
higher tariffs on key exports such as sugar and bananas (Fontagné, 2008, pp.36). 
Moreover, ACP countries would face major competition from Asian and South American 
producers. 
 
3 The Economics of EPAs 
Trade liberalisation in the context of EPAs is expected to generate trade and fiscal effects 
on the economies of the ACP countries. As the ACP countries open up their domestic 
markets to the majority of European products, imports can be expected to be diverted 
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away from domestic and extra-EU sources in favour of European producers. Trade 
liberalisation will also lead to a significant decline in tariff revenues. This chapter 
reviews the theoretical framework for analysing the trade and fiscal effects of EPAs.  
 
3.1 Trade Effects 
Economic theory predicts that free trade agreements lead to Vinerian trade creation or 
trade diversion (Viner, 1950). Milner et al. (2005, pp. 331) use the partial equilibrium 
model of Panagariya (1998) to develop a framework for analysing the welfare effects of a 
PTA. Figure 1 depicts the import demand of a small home country (H) and the upward-
sloping supply of a partner country (P). The supply of two additional trading partners, the 
rest of the world (ROW) and the EU are assumed to be infinitely elastic. This analysis 
makes the assumption that markets are perfectly competitive and that goods from 
different sources are perfectly substitutable. The EU is assumed to be the high-cost 
supplier. 
 
Figure 1. Trade and Welfare Effects of an EU-ACP EPA 
 
Source: Milner et al., 2005, p. 333 
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Initially, the home country imports OM1 from the partner country and M1M2 from the 
ROW (Milner et al., 2005, pp. 331). Introducing an ad valorem tariff (t) on imports from 
outside the PTA implies that ROW will supply the home country at the price PtROW = 
PROW(1+t). If an EPA is concluded between the PTA and the EU, the relevant supply 
price will be PEU and the EU will be the sole supplier. Imports will expand to OM3, where 
M2M3 represents a consumption expansion effect, OM1 a trade creation effect and M1M2 a 
trade diversion effect. These effects are shown in Figure 1 where area a + b represents 
total tariff revenue loss; b is the resource cost of diverting imports from the more efficient 
supplier ROW. Area c + d shows trade creation by increased consumer surplus and area e 
represents increased consumption. 
 
In this analysis, the creation of an EPA could lead to trade being either diverted from the 
rest of the world to the less efficient extra-regional producer EU or created by replacing 
intra-regional imports with more efficient EU imports (Milner et al., 2005, pp. 333). It is 
clear that the more efficient a producer is in relation to the EU, the smaller the cost of 
trade diversion, area b. In sectors where the EU is the globally efficient supplier, there 
will be consumption effects only, resulting in increased consumer welfare 
 
Furthermore, the not yet industrialised ACP countries have used the infant industry 
argument to express their worry that imports from Europe will wipe out their domestic 
industries, which may still need a certain amount of protection in order to be competitive 
(Busse et al. 2004, p. 47). Sectors where the EU uses subsidies to obtain a comparative 
advantage, such as the agricultural sector, are of special interest to protect since ACP 
countries have a natural competitive advantage in this area. 
 
3.2 Fiscal Effects 
The second major implication of the EPAs is that they will have an impact on fiscal 
revenues. In the first phases of liberalisation tax revenues might increase as a result of 
removing prohibitive tariffs and moving towards a uniform tariff rate (Baunsgaard and 
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Keen, 2005, p. 3). However, as liberalisation progresses trade tax revenues will 
eventually decline. For ACP countries the issue of shrinking tariff revenues is critical as 
they continue to rely heavily on import duties as a source of government revenue. 
Customs duties constitute on average 25 percent of government revenue in Africa and 15 
percent in the Pacific (Bilal and Rosa, 2007, pp. 4). In African LDC countries the 
dependency on trade taxes actually increased on average during the period 1999-2001 
relative to 1992-1993. In addition, the fact that trade effects and fiscal effects are linked 
must be taken into account; trade diversion from external suppliers to EU suppliers would 
further increase the loss in revenue. 
 
Since the trade liberalisation following an EPA will inevitably result in losses in tariff 
revenues, it will require compensation of those losses from other sources of revenues, 
preferably from the domestic tax base in order to maintain the same level of revenues 
(Bilal and Rosa, 2007, pp. 4). The popularity of trade taxes is explained mainly by the 
fact that it is simpler to collect taxes at the border than to implement a system that taxes 
domestic consumption and production. In the agriculture based ACP economies, 
structural constraints such as a large informal sector, poor tax administrations, weak 
and/or corrupt institutions and a large number of micro-businesses impede reform of the 
tax system. Fontagné et al. (2008, p. 66) has suggested that a 50 percent improvement in 
revenue collection could substantially alleviate negative fiscal effects. 
 
A frequently advocated option for replacing customs duties is the value-added tax (VAT) 
which today is a key component in most developed countries’ fiscal policies. It has the 
benefits of being transparent and will be non-distortive to production and consumption 
incentives (Ebrill et al., 2002). Furthermore since the VAT is levied on all consumption, 
both imported and domestically produced goods, total government revenue is likely to 
increase as a result. Keen and Ligthart (2002) have showed that for a small open 
economy an optimal strategy is a point-to-point increase in domestic consumption taxes 
for every tariff cut. This reform leaves consumer prices unchanged and does not offset the 
gain from the cut in import duties which brings prices faced by domestic producers closer 
to world market prices. 
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Whilst offsetting revenue losses by a VAT is plausible in theory, for the reasons 
discussed above it might be difficult to implement successfully in practice. There is 
clearly a need for strengthening fiscal administration in ACP countries. Yet, it should be 
noted that a significant part of VAT revenues is already collected at the border on imports 
(IMF, 2005a, p. 12). Therefore these institutions are already in place and could be 
expanded to the inland tax administration. However, empirical evidence on the extent to 
which low-income countries have succeeded in replacing trade taxes with domestic tax 
revenues, suggest that on each lost dollar on average only 30 cents is recovered 
(Baunsgaard and Keen, 2005, p. 22). Furthermore, there is no evidence that the adoption 
of a VAT has been related to the recovery rate. 
 
Other taxes such as personal income tax could also be considered as a means of offsetting 
the revenue loss (Tanzi and Zee, 2001). However it should be taken into account that this 
kind of tax has generated little revenue in developing countries and that few individuals 
actually have an income that could be subject to taxation, especially when it comes to 
taxation at the higher income brackets. Problems with taxing revenue in developing 
countries have in general been related to higher-income earners escaping taxation by 
various exemptions such as tax-free capital gains and various deductions for expenses. 
Moreover, the low level of economic activity in these countries limits the level of tax 
revenue that can be collected from this source. 
 
It is quite possible that an EPA will lead to positive dynamic effects as markets open up 
and producers gain access to cheaper and more differentiated inputs (Bilal and Roza, 
2007, p. 11). The EPA is likely to increase competition, improve the investment climate 
and transfer technology. If these dynamic effects stimulate growth this will broaden the 
tax base and thus help tackle fiscal revenue impacts. 
 
When assessing the magnitude of trade and fiscal effects following an EPA, the 
implementation period as well as the share of goods being liberalised must be taken into 
account. An immediate liberalisation would have a significant shock on fiscal revenues 
 16
and would also constitute a threat to import competing industries. Gradual liberalisation, 
which is a more realistic assumption since the EU has suggested liberalisation over a 
period of 15-20 years, would give the ACP countries time to adjust their industrial 
structure and reform their internal tax-system (Segura-Ubiergo, 2008, p. 43). Similarly, 
exempting some sectors altogether from liberalisation could have a moderating effect. 
However, it should be taken care that the decision of which industries to protect from 
liberalisation is not influenced by protectionist interests, which risks creating a distortive 
outcome (Hinkle and Newfarmer, 2005, pp. 28). If tariffs are not being eliminated on 
import-competing sectors, industries already protected by high tariffs would have no 
incentive to operate more efficiently. Instead it may be wise to exclude agricultural 
products that are essential to food security or cash crops that are a source of revenue for 
the rural population. 
 
4 EPA between the EU and the ECOWAS  
This section will give an account of the EPA negotiations between the ECOWAS and the 
EU up to the time of writing. It presents the pattern of EU-ECOWAS trade and explains 
the key issues in the ongoing negotiations. 
 
4.1 Countries negotiating the EPA 
The negotiations between the 16 West African countries and the EU are being conducted 
by the Regional Negotiation Committee on the West African side and on the behalf of the 
EU by the European Commission (ECOWAS and EC, 2004). The 15 West African 
countries that are currently members of the ECOWAS are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape 
Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. In addition to these countries, Mauritania has 
decided to join the group for the EPA negotiations, despite its departure from the 
ECOWAS community in 2001. The ECOWAS members form a politically and 
economically diverse group. All countries except for Ghana, Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire 
are classified as LDCs (Cape Verde is in a transitional phase, it was recently re-classified 
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as a non-LDC) which means that they benefit from EBA preferences. With a population 
of approximately half of the ECOWAS inhabitants and an extensive oil export, Nigeria is 
the dominant political and economic force in the region. 
 
Production in the region is undiversified, of feeble competitiveness and mainly 
concentrated on primary products (ECDPM, 2006). The ECOWAS countries therefore 
are dependent on exogenous factors such as fluctuations in world market prices, climate 
changes and trading partners’ policies. 
 
Table 1. West African Exports to the EU, by Country  
 
 
ECOWAS exports to the EU, 
million euro 
Share in exports to the 
EU 
 2002 2004 2006  2006  
Benin 59.8 32.5 69.9  0  
Burkina Faso 54.3 41.5 30.7  0  
Cape Verde 24.1 13.4 27.2  0  
Côte d'Ivoire 2645 2201.4 2477  15  
Gambia 24 17.3 11.4  0  
Ghana 1128 1035.9 1107.4  7  
Guinea 479.8 366.9 376.9  2  
Guinea-Bissau 10.9 4.9 3  0  
Liberia 565.9 1064.3 576.6  4  
Mali 75.1 57.3 31.1  0  
Mauritania 375.3 344.9 534.5  3  
Niger 83.9 121.1 130.8  1  
Nigeria 5028.2 5233.1 10624  65  
Sierra Leone 41.8 114.1 123.7  0  
Senegal 409.9 320.3 302.8  2  
Togo 76.9 69.4 117.6  1  
Total 11082.9 11038.3 16544.6  100  
 
Source: EC, 2006a 
 
 
In terms of ACP-EU trade relations, the West African region is important, accounting for 
some 40 percent of all ACP-EU trade (EC, 2006b). However, as a share of total EU extra-
trade, trade flows have remained low; in 2006 ECOWAS imports to the EU only 
accounted for 1.2 percent and exports for 1.3 percent. Exports from the three non-LDC 
countries make up almost all the exports to the EU with Nigeria accounting for a 
substantial share of 65 percent (see Table 1). 
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Table 2. EU 25–ECOWAS + Mauritania: Trade over Time 
 1999 2002 2006 
EU imports million euro 8325.9 11127.2 16545.5 
Agricultural products as % of total imports 36% 31% 19% 
    
EU exports million euro 9895 13125.4 15389.5 
Agricultural products as % of total exports 17% 17% 13% 
    
 
Source: EC, 2006b 
 
Over the last decade, the trade balance between the EU and West Africa has not changed 
significantly; it is largely balanced (see Table 2). The EU imports mostly oil and 
agricultural products from West Africa whereas it exports mainly manufactured good and 
vehicles (EC, 2008). The situation is less positive from the West African perspective 
since the agricultural sector where these countries have their competitive advantage has 
decreased as a share of EU imports. 
 
4.2 State of Play in the negotiations 
Towards the end of 2007, necessary concessions had not been made so that an EPA could 
be finalised between the West African states and the EU. The EU furthermore disagreed 
to the ECOWAS’ request of applying for yet another waiver from the WTO. This resulted 
in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana committing themselves to unilateral interim agreements with 
the EU (Agritrade, 2009). Nigeria, which is less dependent on exports to the EU due to its 
oil production, did not agree to sign an interim agreement. Instead Nigeria asked the 
Commission to apply its GSP+ regime which is a special trading scheme offering 
additional preferences to developing countries that ratify and implement a broad set of 
International Conventions covering human rights, labour standards and sustainable 
development. Nigeria’s request was denied since it had not ratified the United Nations 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide as well as on the 
grounds of a weak legal framework (Guardian, 2009). Nigeria is currently trading under 
the standard GSP scheme and benefits from duty free export of oil which constitutes 95 
percent of Nigeria’s total exports to the EU (EC, 2009). Cape Verde has been allowed to 
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export under the EBA regime for a transition period, having recently been re-classified as 
a non-LDC. 
 
From the EU’s side, the market access proposal includes duty free access for all goods 
originating from ACP countries from 1 January 2008. Rice and sugar are initially 
excluded; they will be duty free from 2010 and 2015 respectively (EC, 2009). This offer 
does not noticeably improve the situation for the LDCs since it is less generous than the 
EBA regime; however it does improve the existing Cotonou regime. 
 
The interim agreements concluded with the Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, which are intended 
to be phased in with the common trade agreement, were signed in late 2008 just before 
the expiration of the Cotonou trade preferences (EC, 2008). Côte d’Ivoire has committed 
itself to liberalising 81 percent of its EU imports over the next 15 years, representing 89 
percent of tariff lines whereas Ghana will liberalise 80 percent of imports, representing 
81 percent of tariff lines. Liberalised imports common for the two agreements include 
machines, certain vehicles and chemicals that are used in local industries and not 
produced domestically. Both countries chose to exclude chicken and other meats, 
tomatoes, onions, sugar, tobacco, beer and worn clothes. In addition Côte d’Ivoire added 
cement, malt, gasoline and cars to the list of products that should not be liberalised. 
Ghana chose instead to exclude wheat, frozen fish and industrial plastics. These products 
were chosen on the basis of protecting local industries and agricultural production but 
also in order to mitigate fiscal revenue losses. 
 
The two interim agreements furthermore include a chapter on trade defence, permitting 
parties to reintroduce MFN duties or quotas should there be an inflow of imports from the 
other party to such an extent that the domestic industry is threatened. In the first phases of 
liberalisation, the possibility of reintroducing protection could be tempting when 
countries are going through a transition period and experience an inflow of imports from 
the partner country. There is also a chapter recognising the need for cooperation in the 
area of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures. However, the standardisation of these 
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measures has not been addressed (ECDPM, 2006). It is currently one of the major non-
tariff barriers to entry for developing countries, particularly for fish products. 
 
In the spirit of establishing a more efficient aid regime, the interim agreements also have 
an “aid for trade” component. One of the major constraints to export expansion and 
industrialisation in the ACP countries is the lack of infrastructure such as roads, ports and 
railroads. This implies high transport costs and presents obstacles to reaching global 
markets (Hinkle et al. 2006, p. 274). Carefully targeted development assistance can 
alleviate such supply-side constraints. As a result of the EPA, other transition costs in 
terms of reforming the tax system, strengthening institutions and establishing a legal 
framework can also be envisaged in the short to medium term. The EU has therefore 
agreed to assist ACP countries during the transition period through the 10th EDF and via 
contributions from Member States (EC, 2008). In the case of the EU - Côte 
d’Ivoire/Ghana interim agreements, development cooperation includes: reinforcement of 
productive sectors, fiscal adjustment, measures to improve the business environment and 
implementation of trade rules in the agreements. 
 
On the regional level, the delay in closing the negotiations is largely due to the fact that it 
has taken West Africa a long time to present an offer (ECDPM, 2006). The region has 
found it difficult to interpret Article XXIV of GATT, to identify and to agree on products 
that should be excluded from the agreement and to agree on the timetable for tariff 
elimination. Negotiations are reported to be almost complete on the text on trade in 
goods, dispute settlement, trade defence instruments, SPS measures, export taxes and 
technical barriers to trade (Acp-eu-trade, 2009). However, significant divergences remain 
on the West African market offer, on the aspect of development cooperation, on rules of 
origin and on the MFN clause (see next section). 
 
Other non-compromised issues include the 0.5 percent levy currently in place on all non-
ECOWAS imports that the EU has requested be eliminated, the ECOWAS views this 
levy as a lifeline. The ECOWAS has on the other hand demanded less restrictive rules of 
origin than the EU proposes. Both parties are aiming at reaching a comprehensive 
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agreement by June 30 2009 but at the time of writing there are strong indications that the 
EPA may not be signed in time (Guardian, 2009). The next section reviews more in detail 
some of the main outstanding issues in the negotiations. 
 
4.3 Key issues 
Regional integration 
As stated in the Cotonou Agreement, regional integration is an important means of 
integrating ACP countries into the world economy and the deepening of the regional 
integration process should therefore be an important cornerstone in the EPA negotiations 
(ECOWAS and EC, 2004, p. 2). In West Africa this process is complicated by the 
coexistence of two regional integration areas in the region: the West African Economic 
and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and the ECOWAS (see Appendix 2). WAEMU 
members share a common currency supported by the French treasury, the CFA franc, 
whereas the other mainly English-speaking countries each have their own currency. An 
initiative to establish a second currency union, the West African Monetary Zone 
(WAMZ), between the non-WAEMU countries has been undertaken with the aim of 
eventually merging it into the CFA franc zone (Agritrade, 2009). Unlike WAEMU which 
is a customs union and a monetary zone, the WAMZ-initiative has not advanced in recent 
years with the time-line for implementation having been pushed back several times. 
WAEMU has achieved deeper regional integration and is more advanced in terms of 
establishing a single market than the rest of the ECOWAS (ECDPM, 2006). The 
phenomenon of overlapping regional groupings within ECOWAS, with differing levels of 
integration and no clear relationship between them, hampers the regional integration 
process. Capital flows and free movement of persons within the region are still very 
limited and need to be improved. 
 
In order to ensure WTO-compatibility and deepen regional integration, prior to the 
implementation of the EPA ECOWAS countries must establish a customs union with a 
common external tariff (CET) for which the WAEMU-tariff serves as a basis. By request 
of Nigeria a fifth band of 35 percent, representing the highest tariff line, was added before 
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its final adoption. The matter of the CET has been controversial given that large 
differences in applied tariffs exist between countries (Guardian, 2009). Recently, the 
ECOWAS ministers have demanded that the fifth band should be re-negotiated with the 
WTO to finally determine its product coverage, thus indicating that the CET may not be 
implemented in time. 
 
Political instability and divisions between the French-speaking and English-speaking 
countries furthermore complicates reaching political consent. Following the suspension 
of Guinea from the ECOWAS as a consequence of December’s military coup, the 
question of how to proceed with ratification of the agreement in such situations has risen 
(Agritrade, 2009). Furthermore, because the West African grouping for the EPA 
negotiations includes Mauritania, the issue also has to be solved of how to include 
Mauritania in the regional integration process. Mauritania left the ECOWAS in 2001 and 
has since remained a member of the Arab Maghreb Union. 
 
Finally there is a general worry that European imports will weaken the synergy and 
integration within West Africa; trade within the region remains low, accounting for 
merely 8.3 percent of total trade in 2006. Within UEMOA intra-regional trade accounted 
for slightly more, 13 percent (ADI, 2008, p. 87). These figures could however be 
underestimated due to large-scale informal trade in the region, particularly cross-border 
trade which is not registered by the customs authorities (Agritrade, 2009). 
 
Market Access 
A draft regional market access offer was tabled by West Africa in February 2009, 
proposing liberalisation of 60 percent of EU imports over 25 years starting in 2010 (TNI, 
2009b, p. 13). The Commission has questioned its WTO-compatibility with regards to the 
coverage, reciprocity and the transition period. The EU maintains its position that a final 
market access offer must include most sectors and cover 90 percent of bilateral trade. 
 
For West Africa, the main issues regarding the negotiations on agriculture evolve around 
food security for the regions growing population and import competition from European 
 23
producers (Agritrade, 2009). Production and processing of raw materials are key sectors 
for the West African countries. Countries like Nigeria and Senegal are also particularly 
worried that the EPA will result in de-industrialisation. 
 
Another matter for divergence is the subject of the MFN clause that the EU has proposed 
should be included in the EPAs (Agritrade, 2009). It obligates West Africa to grant the 
same trading preferences to the EU that they would to any other trading partner in a 
bilateral agreement, should the exports from the third country amount to more than 1 
percent of total exports. This is a step towards WTO-compatibility but has also been a 
matter for concern for some countries who try to reduce their over-dependency on EU 
imports. Commentators have argued that the MFN clause would inhibit south-south trade 
and that it would reduce the scope for signing bilateral trade agreements with other 
trading partners. 
 
Development 
The negotiations are further complicated by the coexistence of several LDCs and the 
three non-LDCs: Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria. For the LDCs, the EPA will not 
radically improve their market access to the EU since they are already entitled to EBA 
preferences. The three non-LDCs, accounting for 87 percent of exports to the EU (see 
Table 1), obviously have a greater interest in concluding an EPA and improving their 
access to the European market. 
 
Nigeria in particular stands out as an important political and economic force in the region 
with its population representing half of the regions inhabitants and accounting for 65 
percent of exports to the EU. Its independency on bilateral trade with the EU has turned it 
into an outspoken EPA-opponent. The fact that Nigeria refused to sign an interim 
agreement indicates that the conclusion of the final agreement may prove to be 
complicated. 
 
On the issue of the development assistance, the parties have decided to implement a 
framework for development cooperation through the West Africa EPA Development 
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Program (EPADP) (TNI, 2009a, p. 13). The EC has agreed to fund support related to 
fiscal transition while West Africa is trying to establish a link between its trade 
liberalisation commitments and financial support related to improved competitiveness 
and production structure in the region. The EC is not in favour of extending its support to 
that extent. The following section will look at empirical evidence related to the West 
African EPA. 
 
5 Trade and Fiscal Effects of the EU-ECOWAS EPA 
This section summarises empirical studies estimating the impacts of an EPA on the West 
African countries. Estimates on the impact of trade liberalisation will be reported from 
aggregated studies analysing the effects on the majority of ECOWAS countries, as well 
as from case studies conducted on individual countries.  
 
As an introduction, the main features of the fiscal systems of the West African countries 
on which the case studies were made will be presented. The data is obtained from IMF 
staff reports; therefore the availability of data varies from year to year. Fiscal systems are 
mainly composed of taxes that can be divided into three broad groups: taxes on 
international trade and transactions, taxes on goods and services and taxes on income 
profits. For many West African countries other sources of revenue such as grants and 
specific taxes on mineral and oil extraction are very important. They are not always 
noticeable in the figures below. 
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Figure 2. Taxes on International Trade and Transactions in ECOWAS Countries 
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Source: IMF Selected Issues and Article IV Consultations 
 
The reliance on trade taxes is high in general in West Africa (see Figure 2). In countries 
like Gambia, Sierra Leone and Mali it is especially significant, amounting to nearly 50 
percent of government revenue. However, in most of the countries depicted the trend 
goes towards decreasing importance of trade taxes, especially in countries such as 
Senegal that has successfully implemented fiscal reform (see the section on Senegal 
below) 
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Figure 3. Taxes on Goods and Services in ECOWAS Countries 
Taxes on goods and services
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Source: IMF Selected Issues and Article IV Consultations 
 
Taxes on goods and services where the VAT is an important component make up a 
substantial share of total revenues in Burkina Faso, Senegal and Guinea (see Figure 3). 
The trend is pointing towards an increase in the revenue share of these taxes; however, 
for Guinea, their share is on the decline. 
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Figure 4. Taxes on Income and Profits in ECOWAS Countries 
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As can be seen in Figure 4, countries with a high level of mineral extraction or a large 
tourism sector such as Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Gambia have a high share of taxes on 
income and profits. In fact Nigeria’s oil-revenue accounted for a substantial 85 percent of 
total revenues in 2006; this explains Nigeria’s particularly low reliance on other revenue 
sources. For the majority of countries, the share of these taxes in total revenue seems to 
have remained more or less constant. 
 
5.1 Aggregate Studies 
When analysing the quantitative effects of trade agreements, a partial or a general 
equilibrium model is commonly used. General equilibrium models attempt to predict the 
effects on the economy as a whole and to capture the dynamic effects of interactions 
between different sectors of the economy (Karingi, 2005, pp. 22). Thus they are suitable 
for analysing the effects of EPAs as they would identify substitution between producers 
as well as predict which countries are likely to benefit and which are likely to lose from 
an EPA. However, general equilibrium models demand highly detailed data on sectoral 
production and on substitution elasticities. These data are rarely widely available for 
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developing countries with large informal sectors; moreover the predictions are likely to 
be vague since these countries are often exposed to domestic and external shocks. 
Instead, many studies on the subject have performed a partial equilibrium analysis. These 
models estimate detailed effects of trade creation and trade diversion, and can also be 
used to predict impact on fiscal revenue. 
 
Busse et al. (2004, pp. 17) use a partial equilibrium model for estimating the impact of an 
EPA on trade flows in ECOWAS countries2 and in Mauritania. The data has been 
obtained from the UNCTAD, the UNIDO and the ITC. This study is the most detailed 
and comprehensive study to have been made on the impact of the foreseen EPA on the 
ECOWAS. It will therefore be used to compare results from other studies reviewed. 
Busse et al. apply the model of Verdoorn (1960) which incorporates Armington 
assumptions, i.e. goods from different countries are perceived as imperfect substitutes. In 
the case of the West African EPA this a reasonable assumption to make since most of 
West Africa’s imports are manufactured goods. When estimating trade creation and trade 
diversion, data on import demand and substitution elasticities are required in order to 
account for product differentiation. As these data are not easily available for West 
African countries the values of elasticities have to be assumed. Three liberalisation 
scenarios are assumed: high, mid and low with respective differing elasticities. 
 
In this analysis it is assumed that 100 percent of imports will be liberalised which will not 
be the case in the agreements currently being negotiated, thus the results can be seen as 
upper limit estimates of the impact on trade flows and fiscal revenues (Busse et al., 2004, 
p. 24). The base year for all estimations is 2001. 
 
                                                  
2 Liberia and Sierra Leone are not included in the analysis due to insufficient data. 
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Table 3. Trade Effects under an EPA on ECOWAS Countries, 2001 
 Trade creation Trade diversion Total trade effects 
Country 
 
mill. US$ 
 
% of 
preferred 
imports 
mill. US$ 
 
% of non-
preferred 
imports 
mill. US$ 
 
% of 
preferred 
imports 
Benin 20.4 7.6% 10.7 3.2% 31.1 11.6% 
Burkina Faso 14.1 5.7% 9.8 3.2% 23.9 9.7% 
Cape Verde 16.9 9.2% 4.5 7.1% 21.5 11.7% 
Côte d'Ivoire 69.3 6.0% 25.3 2.9% 94.7 8.2% 
Gambia 8.2 5.8% 5.8 6.6% 14.0 9.9% 
Ghana 45.8 3.7% 40.2 2.4% 85.9 6.9% 
Guinea 14.3 4.9% 10 3.3% 24.3 8.3% 
Guinea-Bissau 1.6 4.5% 0.3 1.1% 1.9 5.2% 
Mali 13.3 3.6% 8.3 1.3% 21.6 5.9% 
Mauritania 9.8 5.5% 5.4 2.8% 15.2 8.6% 
Niger 4.6 4.9% 3.5 1.5% 8.1 8.6% 
Nigeria 348.3 12.5% 229.1 7.6% 577.4 20.8% 
Senegal 71.2 8.0% 31.4 3.8% 102.7 11.5% 
Togo 10.1 8.7% 6.5 3.2% 16.6 10.9% 
 
Source: Busse et al., 2004, p. 25 
 
For all countries and scenarios, trade creation exceeds trade diversion. Table 3 reports the 
results from the mid scenario which shows an expected increase in total imports (trade 
creation plus trade diversion) ranging between 5.2 percent and 20.8 percent of preferred 
imports. The most significant effects can be observed for Nigeria (20.8 percent), Cape 
Verde (11.7 percent), Benin (11.6 percent) and Senegal (11.5 percent), whereas in 
Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Ghana smaller increases in trade volumes can be expected of 
5.2 percent, 5.9 percent and 6.9 percent respectively. The key reasons for the larger 
increases are high tariff rates on EU imports in these countries and/or high duty 
collection-efficiency ratios3 (see Table 4). 
                                                  
3 Collection-efficiency ratio is defined as the share of duty collected on the c.i.f value of imports divided by 
an import-weighted tariff. 
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Table 4. Decline in Import Duties in ECOWAS Countries, 2001 
     
Decline in import 
duties      
Country 
 
mill. 
US$ 
% of total 
import duties 
% of total 
government 
revenue 
% of GDP 
 
Import duty 
collection 
efficiency 
ratio (%) 
Imports from 
the EU, 
% of total 
imports 
Benin  27.6 47.4% 8.6% 1.16% 76.5 44.4 
Burkina Faso 17.5 46.8% 5.6% 0.71% 61.3 44.6 
Cape Verde 24.0 79.9% 19.8% 4.09% 78.7 74.3 
Côte d’Ivoire 82.9 55.5% 4.6% 0.80% 68.8 57.4 
Gambia 13.8 65.0% 21.9% 3.54% 78.3 61.8 
Ghana 90.8 66.4% 10.3% 1.82% 29.1 43.1 
Guinea 16.7 51.6% 4.9% 0.56% 89.9 49.0 
Guinea-Bissau 2.16 65.8% 5.6% 1.09% 38.2 59.7 
Mali 16.6 35.6% 3.8% 0.63% 43.7 36.3 
Mauritania 11.8 49.3% 6.3% 1.17% 73.3 47.5 
Niger 6.6 29.6% 3.6% 0.34% 53.4 28.9 
Nigeria 487.8 52.7% 2.5% 1.19% 79.7 47.9 
Senegal 87.9 60.0% 10.7% 1.89% 90.0 51.8 
Togo 12.9 43.2% 7.4% 1.02% 77.0 43.0 
 
Source: Busse et al. 2004, pp. 28 
 
The decline in import duties and government revenue from the mid scenario is reported in 
table 4. The most severely affected countries are Cape Verde and Gambia with estimated 
declines in government revenues of 19.8 and 21.9 percent of government revenues 
respectively for the mid scenario. This will put a heavy strain on their public finances and 
will be difficult to compensate for with other taxes. As was the case with the analysis on 
trade flows, these results are due to the dependency on EU imports of these countries and 
the high collection efficiency ratios. For Senegal and Ghana the impact is reduced but 
still significant; they face revenue losses of 10.7 and 10.3 percent respectively for the mid 
scenario. 
 
Nielsen and Zouhon-Bi (2007) perform the same kind of partial equilibrium analysis as 
per Busse et al., using the model of Verdoorn (1960). They perform their analysis on four 
of the ECOWAS members: Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal and Cape Verde and assume 
complete liberalisation at the initial stage of the EPA. The data being used was obtained 
from IMF staff reports and from desk officers. The base year for all estimations is 2004. 
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Table 5. EU-ECOWAS EPA: Trade and Fiscal Effects 
  Cape Verde Ghana Nigeria Senegal 
Trade effects     
Total trade effects (millions US $) 36.2 199.5 903.9 166.3 
% of preferred imports (EU) 11.4 10.9 11.5 10.6 
      
Tariff revenue loss     
million US $ 34.3 150.6 682 154.7 
% of Total Government Revenue 15.8 7.1 2.4 10.4 
% of GDP 3.6 1.7 1.0 2.0 
 
Source: Nielsen and Zouhon-Bi, 2007, p.12 
 
Regarding trade effects (see table 5), the results for Cape Verde and Senegal are in line 
with those of Busse et al. (2004). For Ghana, Busse et al. estimated smaller trade effects, 
while those for Nigeria were significantly higher, 20.8 percent compared to 10.8 percent 
in this analysis. Trade creation exceeds trade diversion for Nigeria and Ghana in relative 
terms, the opposite is true for Cape Verde and Senegal. The differing results from the two 
studies are likely due to newer data used by Nielsen and Zouhon-Bi and the fact that 
Busse et al. assumed 3 different sets of elasticities for agricultural products, raw materials 
and for manufactured goods whereas Nielsen and Zouhon-Bi applied the same elasticities 
all over. Turning to the fiscal effects, these estimates are lower for Cape Verde and 
Ghana compared to those of Busse et al. 
 
5.2 Case Studies 
This section reports findings from eight case studies on individual West African 
countries. The majority of these studies were prepared for the West African governments 
in support for the EPA negotiations and financed by the Secretariat of the ACP group of 
states; one of them is a study by the IMF. The choice of what countries to include in this 
section was based on the availability and the quality of accessible studies. 
Complementary material and data has in addition been obtained from the IMF. 
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5.2.1 Burkina Faso 
Despite being a landlocked, small country suffering from a dry climate, growth has been 
steady and vigorous in Burkina Faso during the last decade, with an annual growth rate of 
on average 6.1 percent for the period 1995-2002 (P.C.I., 2005, p. 27). This good 
performance is mainly due to reform efforts, aiming at liberalising the economy and 
improving the administration of public finances. 
 
Cotton, gold and bovine products along with fruit and vegetables are the main export 
goods (P.C.I., 2005, p. 56). Since they are all primary goods, with a small amount of 
differentiation, they are particularly exposed to fluctuations in world market prices. The 
cotton sector, which accounts for around 60 percent of exports, is expected to be 
positively affected from an EPA as a result of producers gaining access to cheaper and 
more available inputs (ibid. pp. 59). Other sensitive sectors include the bovine sector 
which faces competition from frozen meat exported from Europe to neighbouring 
countries. Furthermore, non-tariff barriers like sanitary norms limit prospective exports in 
this sector. Several sectors of the economy face competition from lower-cost European 
imports including: rice producers, sugar and tobacco processors as well as several 
manufacturing industries. 
 
Estimations of trade and fiscal effects from an EPA have been estimated in a partial 
equilibrium model with Armington assumptions (P.C.I., 2005, pp. 91). Elasticities of 
substitution are estimated on three levels depending on the origin of the product. The 
liberalisation is assumed to take place over twelve years. According to the simulations, 
imports from the EU would increase with 31 percent, with imports from the ECOWAS 
falling with 5.31 percent, respectively 4.41 percent for the ROW. Trade effects are 
expected to be largely positive with trade creation exceeding trade diversion. Losses in 
tariff revenues of 11.9 billion CFAF annually are estimated (ibid. pp. 98). According to 
the data used in the case study, this represents 11.8 percent of import duties in 2003 and 
2.7 percent of total government revenue. 
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Burkina Faso has a relatively high share of indirect taxes, taxes on goods and services 
represent around 50 percent of total revenues (see Figure 2). The share of trade taxes are 
on the other hand relatively low accounting for 16 percent of revenues. The latest series 
of fiscal reforms foreseen by the Burkinabe authorities addresses the tax administration 
and aims to enlarge the fiscal base. A system for sending reminders to non-filers and late-
filers will be implemented to strengthen revenue collection and a mechanism for 
refunding VAT within 90 days will be introduced (IMF, 2007, pp. 19). Moreover, 
taxation for small taxpayers will be simplified. 
 
5.2.2 The Gambia 
The Gambia is a small agrarian economy entirely surrounded by Senegal except along its 
Western coast. The most important cash crop is the groundnut; other key sectors are 
fisheries, horticulture and cereals (Enterplan, 2005b, pp. 5). Given that 70 percent of the 
population derives its livelihood from agriculture, protecting this sector is likely to be a 
priority for The Gambia in the EPA negotiations. The fastest growing sector is the 
tourism sector contributing to around 16 percent of GDP; this sector constitutes an 
opportunity in the EPA context in terms of foreign direct investment (FDI) which should 
be embraced. 
 
Trade with the EU has been growing steadily over time and accounts for a substantial 
share of total trade, 65 percent in 2003 (Enterplan, 2005b, p. 38). Its other main trading 
partners are Asia and North America; trade with the ECOWAS is limited but is likely to 
be underestimated since a large share of trade flows are not registered. The Gambia has 
for a long while been a hub for re-exports to neighbouring countries which makes it 
highly dependant on import duties as a source of government revenue. Taxes on 
international trade constitute nearly 50 percent of government revenue (see figure 2). 
 
Using the same partial equilibrium model as per Busse et al. (2004), Enterplan (2005b, 
pp. 60) estimates trade creation and trade diversion effects for the Gambia as a result of 
an EPA. The same import elasticities are used as those used in the study by Busse et al. 
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For the scenario which potentially is the most likely scenario, trade creation and trade 
diversion effects are equal at 6.6 percent. Under the low scenario, trade creation exceeds 
trade diversion slightly whereas the situation is reversed for the high scenario. The 
Gambia produces few manufactured goods so imports from the EU do not pose a threat in 
that sense. However, local poultry production, which is common at the household level, 
faces competition from frozen meat exported from the EU. Other sensitive products are 
wheat, maize and millet which all will find it hard to compete with large-scale and cheap 
European production. 
 
The decline in tariff revenue as a result of the EPA will amount to 33 percent of total 
import duties (Enterplan, 2005b, p. 67). These losses represent 15.4 percent of 
government revenue and 2.8 percent of the GDP. The significance of these losses is a 
result of The Gambia’s large share of EU imports and high dependency on import duties 
in government revenue. However, Busse et al. (2004) estimated significantly larger 
revenue losses of 65 percent of import duties and 21.9 percent of public revenues. The 
differences are likely to be due to the different sources from where data were obtained; 
Enterplan used data obtained from the Gambian Customs authority and Busse et al. 
obtained their data from UNCTAD, UNIDO and ITC. Also, Enterplan, calculated a 
slightly different collection efficiency ratio, 73.8 percent, compared to Busse et al., 78.3 
percent. 
 
Over the last four years, reform of the fiscal system has been concentrated on improving 
the revenue administration (IMF, 2008, p. 16). The Gambia Revenue Authority was 
established together with a large taxpayer unit and the introduction of identification 
numbers for tax payers. With gains from improved administration now reaching its limit, 
the authorities are instead focusing on reducing the proportion of imports exempt from 
customs duties and on reducing the overall dependency on import taxes in revenues. The 
biggest challenge for The Gambia in coping with the fiscal effects from an EPA will lie 
in decreasing its reliance on trade taxes as a main source of fiscal revenue. 
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5.2.3 Guinea 
Guinea, despite its rich endowment of mineral resources is one of the poorest countries in 
the world, ranking extremely low in terms of the human development index (HDI). It is 
estimated that Guinea holds a third of the world’s bauxite4 reserves and is also abundant 
in gold, diamonds, iron ore and uranium (IMF, 2007, p. 5). Political conflicts in 
neighbouring countries Sierra Leone and Liberia have contributed to severe regional 
insecurity and to an unfavourable investment climate; transport on land along the 
Liberian border has become nearly impossible due to security constraints. 
 
Guinea is more dependent on exports of minerals than any other ECOWAS country, 
exports of bauxite and aluminum account for around 60 percent of total exports and 
generate a quarter of fiscal revenues (Saeed Qureshi and Fedorov, 2008, pp. 3). World 
aluminum demand is expected to increase in the medium term and Guinea could play a 
critical role in meeting this demand. However, the mining industry is underdeveloped and 
has an unexploited potential as there are few local refining facilities and most bauxite is 
exported raw; bauxite prices are weakly correlated with aluminum prices. Furthermore, 
taxation of the mining companies is not uniform and contributes to an unfavourable 
investment climate; this sector has the potential to contribute much more to government 
revenue. 
 
Guinea is not a major producer of agricultural products. Therefore its export sector is 
unlikely to be affected by competition from European imports but certain areas of local 
production may face competition from European producers. Bovine and dairy products 
run the risk of being replaced by subsidised European foodstuffs (METRA, 2004, pp. 
A21). Production of potatoes and onion is also especially vulnerable since European 
production of these crops is on the increase with the new Eastern European accession 
countries. Conversely, unexploited sectors such as the fishing and the forestry industry 
are likely to benefit from an EPA. The fishing industry in particular could gain access to 
technologies that would make it compatible with European SPS standards. Liberalising 
                                                  
4 Bauxite is an aluminium ore that is usually processed into aluminium. 
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the economy would also be particularly valuable for the mining sector which could bring 
in large amounts of FDI. 
 
Public finances have run a large budget deficit since 2000 when growth stalled; public 
expenditure is now to a large extent dependent on grants. Taxes on international trade 
represent between 17 and 20 percent of total government revenue, which is less than for 
the average West African country (see Figure 2). More worryingly is the evidence that 
taxes on goods and services as a share of total revenue is declining significantly; their 
part in revenues has fallen from almost one half of revenues in 2003 to around 30 percent 
in 2006. Revenue losses following an EPA are estimated at 129.6 billion CFAF 
representing 78 percent of import duties and 12.4 percent of total government revenue 
(METRA, 2004, pp. 58). These estimates are not obtained through a partial or general 
equilibrium approach but are simply approximated by using data from the Guinean 
customs authorities and calculating the share of EU imports in duties for 2003. They do 
not predict future revenues and must be interpreted with some caution. These losses are 
significantly larger than the revenue losses estimated by Busse et al. (2004). 
 
Guinean authorities have embarked upon a reform of the Mining Code in order to 
streamline and improve the taxation regime intending to increase its contribution to 
government revenue (Saeed Qureshi and Fedorov, 2008, pp. 11). Moreover, measures 
have been implemented to reduce tax and tariff exemptions and to strengthen the customs 
and tax administration. Due to a turbulent political environment it has been difficult to 
implement any long-term reforms. 
 
5.2.4 Mali 
Since the 1990’s, the economy of Mali has doubled in size and growth has averaged 
almost 5 percent, yet Mali still remains very poor (IMF, 2008, p. 6). The main exports are 
gold and non-manufactured cotton, making Mali highly vulnerable to draught and 
external shocks. A persistent low world price for cotton, partly due to subsidies given to 
cotton producers in developed countries, has hampered growth in the agricultural sector, 
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the core of the economy. Mali is also a main exporter of bovine products to Senegal and 
Côte d’Ivoire and under an EPA trade in these products runs a risk of being substituted by 
EU suppliers. 
 
The impact of an EPA on the Malian economy is estimated by using a computable 
generable equilibrium (CGE) model (Rampulla et al., 2007, pp. 24). Five scenarios are 
envisaged depending on the scope and transition period of the liberalisation. Results from 
scenario 1, which assumes full and immediate liberalisation will be reported here in order 
to facilitate comparison with Busse et al. (2004). The following impacts on 
macroeconomic factors compared to the base scenario when the EPA is not implemented 
are estimated: the annual rate of investment is expected to increase, the GDP growth rate 
will increase, EU imports are likely to increase but not remarkably and Malian exports 
are expected to decrease (Rampulla et al., 2007, pp. 38). The last effect could be 
explained by the reliance on export of raw gold and cotton which will not directly benefit 
from an EPA. 
 
Mali is heavily reliant on trade taxes as a means of financing public expenditure, trade 
taxes have averaged between 45-50 percent during 1996-2002 (see Figure 2). However, 
almost 70 percent of these revenues are composed of VAT on imports and import duties 
on petroleum products levied within the ECOWAS. The VAT will continue to apply on 
imports after liberalisation. Trade liberalisation under an EPA would lead to losses in 
fiscal revenues of 18.4 billion CFAF which according to the data used represents 17 
percent of import duties and 3.6 percent of total revenues (Rampulla et al., 2007, pp. 43). 
The CGE model further allows for taking into account the potential dynamic effects that 
an EPA would have on the Malian economy. This would reduce revenue losses to 13.5 
percent of import duties (2.8 percent of total revenues). These losses are compared to 
previous studies very small; Busse et al. (2004) estimated revenue losses of 35.6 percent. 
As discussed before, CGE models require detailed data on the entire economy, and the 
quality of data drives the results, thus these models are probably less suitable to use in 
this context. 
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Late tax reforms in Mali have been positive and have been taking important steps towards 
the transition of a fiscal system more reliant on indirect taxes (Rampulla et al., 2007, p. 
48). The measures undertaken include the suppression of a general tax on all revenues in 
favour of schedular taxes, a wider application of the VAT and unification of the VAT rate 
of 18 percent as well as the adoption of the ECOWAS CET. In addition, efforts have 
been made to expand the tax base towards the informal sector, to computerise the tax 
administration and to educate tax officers. However, a large share of the economy, 
mainly the informal sector is still exempted from taxation and as few as 400 companies 
account for 80 percent of total tax revenues. The agricultural sector is not subject to any 
taxation at all. The reforms regarding the VAT seem to have been well directed; the share 
of taxes on goods and services in total revenues has almost doubled during the period 
1996-2002; they accounted for nearly 20 percent of revenues in 2002 compared to 12 
percent in 1996. 
 
5.2.5 Niger 
The landlocked country of Niger has one of the fastest growing populations in the world, 
who are mostly reliant on subsistence agriculture, cattle and fishing (IMF, 2008, pp. 4). 
Its main export good, uranium, has developed favourably; the price of uranium rose 
dramatically in 2002 and doubled between 2007 and 2008.  
 
Niger is also a big producer of foodstuffs, it has specialised in onion production which it 
exports to Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Togo, Ghana and Burkina Faso (Blein et al., 2004, pp. 
135). The onion variety exported currently faces competition from the EU and the 
Maghreb countries, thus the EPA could divert trade from Nigerien producers. 
Furthermore, the bovine and the dairy sectors face competition from subsidised more 
competitive European products. Niger currently exports meat within West Africa and is 
planning to expand its exports to Central Africa. 
 
Niger is relatively dependent on trade taxes as a source of revenue; they constituted 36 
percent of revenues in 2003 (see figures 2-4). Income and profit tax and taxes on goods 
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and services accounted for 12.8 and 15.4 percent respectively. Blein et al. (2004, pp. 104) 
estimate losses in fiscal revenues simply by computing the average annual growth ratio 
for EU imports and then use it to predict import data for 2007. They estimate tariff losses 
of 47.2 percent of import duties representing 14 percent of fiscal revenues (predicted data 
on government revenue for 2007 was not available). Busse et al. (2004) estimated lower 
revenue losses of around 30 percent which perhaps is a more realistic assumption since 
Niger imports less from the EU than the average West African country (28.9 percent 
compared to around 50 percent). 
 
The contribution of the uranium sector to total revenues is a mere 3 percent hence Niger 
has recently made investments in the mining sector which is likely to generate tax 
revenues (IMF, 2008, pp. 10). Efforts have also been made to strengthen the tax 
administration. In order to improve the investment climate and to attract FDI, the 
authorities intend to reduce the corporate profit tax rate from 35 percent to 30 percent. 
This reform is also expected to promote diversification of the economy. 
 
5.2.6 Nigeria 
The case of Nigeria is different from the other ECOWAS members due to its very large 
oil sector generating some 40 percent of GDP and also its large population of 
approximately 130 million (Enterplan, 2005a, p. 9). Since the 1970’s, Nigeria has been 
one of the worlds major oil producers and as a consequence has enjoyed higher growth 
than the rest of the region. The economy is heavily dependent on oil; revenues related to 
the oil sector such as petroleum profit tax and export tax on crude oil accounted for 85 
percent of tax revenues in 2006 (see section 5.1). Because of the importance of oil as a 
source of revenue other sectors of the economy have suffered; Nigeria has for example 
been a net importer of food since the 1990’s (Gobat, 2005, p. 23). These are major factors 
in explaining the outspoken Nigerian resistance to the EPA. 
 
Enterplan (2005a, pp. 71) assesses the impacts of an EPA on the Nigerian economy by 
using a partial equilibrium model to estimate the effect on fiscal revenues and a CGE 
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model for determining the welfare effects of an EPA on GDP, consumption and 
production. The partial equilibrium analysis assumes gradual liberalisation over twelve 
years with 80 percent of EU imports being liberalised. Products that could be good 
candidates for liberalisation are divided into three groups: agriculture products for 
politically sensitive reasons, products that generate the highest tariff revenues or products 
with the highest MFN tariffs. The different scenarios result in losses of 42 percent of 
tariff revenue on average, representing around 3 percent of government revenue. More 
specifically and as expected, excluding goods that generate the most revenue would have 
the least impact on fiscal revenue, followed by agricultural products. These results are in 
line with those of Busse et al. (2004) who estimated tariff revenue losses of 52.7 percent 
but assumed full and immediate liberalisation. No information on import demand and 
substitution elasticities or whether collection efficiency ratios were taken into account is 
available for the case study. 
 
The results from the CGE simulations indicate that protecting agriculture would have a 
positive impact on GDP two years on from the initial implementation (Enterplan, 2005a., 
p. 83). Turning to production, the agricultural sector is the most sensitive sector to 
liberalisation. The effects on manufacturing production are slightly less significant. 
Output in these two sectors would suffer initially from liberalisation but is expected to 
pick up after a transition period of a few years. 
 
In the long term, the problem for Nigeria in reaching fiscal stability lies in its dependency 
on crude oil (Baunsgaard, 2003. p. 4). The high volatility of world oil market prices has 
lead to unpredictable government revenue which in turn has encouraged procyclical 
spending and has spilled over into budget deficits generating a negative growth 
performance. Past policy measures have not succeeded in transferring profits from oil 
revenues to other sectors in order to enhance their competitiveness. Furthermore, reliance 
on oil export is a risky strategy in the long run. Assuming that environmental agreements 
such as the Kyoto Protocol will have an effect on the demand for oil within the 
foreseeable future, the prospect for growth in Nigerian exports will be reduced. 
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In 2004, seeking to tackle the deficiencies in fiscal policy and achieving macroeconomic 
stability, the government introduced an oil-price-based fiscal rule (IMF, 2007, p. 10). 
Based on a budgeted oil price, any oil revenue in excess of predicted revenue is 
transferred into an oil-savings account at the central bank. An EPA between the 
ECOWAS and the EU could contribute positively in diversifying the economy away from 
oil. It could also play an important role in attracting investment to the non-oil private 
sector which has experienced negative growth in productivity between 1960 and 2000 
(Gobat, 2005, p. 25). Increased productivity in the non-oil sectors is vital for broadening 
the tax base and increasing the importance of other sources of revenue such as VAT and 
personal income tax. 
 
5.2.7 Senegal 
Senegal has been experiencing higher growth than the average for West African countries 
which has boosted investment in infrastructure and made improvements in reducing 
poverty (Mitra, 2008, pp. 3). However, its main export products: fish, groundnut 
products, refined petrol and phosphoric acid have all been decreasing in value and 
volume over the last two decades. Senegal is amongst the countries in the region that 
most fiercely opposes the EPA. 
 
Simulations of the impacts on trade for Senegal assume that trade diversion of 10 percent 
of preferred imports would occur (Segura-Ubiergo, 2008, p. 43). The actual trade 
diversion effects could potentially be smaller though, since the share of EU imports is 
already high and the elasticity of substitution of imports from Asian exporters is low. EU 
imports are likely to divert imports from countries with similar production structures, like 
the US and Canada. 
 
Moving on to prospective losses from tariff revenues, three main scenarios of 
liberalisation have been set up: (i) a full and immediate trade liberalisation, (ii) 
substantial and immediate liberalisation and (iii) substantial but gradual liberalisation 
(Segura-Ubiergo, 2008, p. 43). Substantial liberalisation implies that 80 percent of all 
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imports are being liberalised. Scenario (iii) includes three different possibilities with 
regard to the pace of liberalisation: frontloaded, progressive and backloaded. Estimates 
under scenario (iii) are presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 6. Average Annual Revenue Loss by Liberalisation Scenario, Senegal (% of GDP) 
  2010-2014 2015-2019 2020-2024 2025 onwards 2010-2024 
      
Frontloaded liberalisation 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 0.8 
% of total revenues  3     
      
Progressive liberalisation 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2 0.6 
% of total revenues  1.5     
      
Backloaded liberalisation 0.2 0.4 0.6 1.2 0.4 
% of total revenues 1     
      
Source: Segura-Ubiergo, 2008, p. 46 
 
As can be seen from Table 5, frontloaded trade liberalisation leads to large initial losses 
of 0.6 percent of GDP which would be a major shock for the Senegalese fiscal system. 
Progressive liberalisation implies an initial revenue loss of 0.3 percent of GDP 
representing 1.5 percent of total revenues. A backloaded liberalisation will generate a 
smaller revenue loss corresponding to 0.2 percent of GDP in the first years but towards 
the end of the implementation period, losses will rise more significantly than under the 
other scenarios. 
 
The Senegalese fiscal system is considered strong in comparison to most sub-Saharan 
countries and many of its implemented tax reforms are considered best practice (Segura-
Ubiergo, 2008, pp. 40). Tax revenues as percent of GDP have been steadily increasing 
from 12 percent in 1994 to 20 percent in 2007.  The country has decreased its dependency 
on trade taxes significantly: in 1996 they accounted for almost 30 percent of total 
revenues and in 2003 for 15 percent (see Figures 2-4). Taxes on income and profits have 
remained constant at around 22 percent of total revenues whilst taxes on goods and 
services have increased as share of revenues; they accounted for 42.9 percent of total 
revenues in 2003. Recently introduced tax reforms include the introduction of the 
WAEMU common external tariff and the simplification of various key taxes and the 
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VAT. On the administrative side, tax-payers’ identification numbers have been 
introduced and the tax authorities’ collection system has been computerised. 
Furthermore, Senegalese authorities keep up a persistent resistance against corruption and 
tax evasion. 
 
5.2.8 Sierra Leone 
After a decade of war, Sierra Leone’s economic performance lags behind the sub-Saharan 
African average despite some strong economic growth in recent years. It ranks last on the 
2008 HDI index. Production in Sierra Leone is mainly concentrated in the agricultural 
sector; rice is the main cash crop but cocoa and coffee are also important export goods 
(Landell Mills, 2006. pp. 63). Furthermore, Sierra Leone has a large mining sector 
producing diamonds on a large scale as well as rutile (an ore of titanium) and bauxite. 
 
Public finances are relatively weak; over the last few years Sierra Leone has had an 
important budget deficit of on average 12 percent of GDP (Landell Mills 2006, p. 7). 
Trade taxes as a share of government revenue have fluctuated between 40 and 50 percent 
during the last ten years (see Figure 2). The share of taxes on goods and services in total 
revenues is growing; it is higher than in countries like Mali, Niger and Gambia. In 
comparison to other ECOWAS members, the share of imports from the EU is moderate; 
in 2003 they made up 30 percent of total imports whereas EU imports in neighbouring 
countries often account for nearly 50 percent of GDP (ibid., p. 50). This is reflected in 
high import-weighted tariff rates for EU imports of 16.7 percent, compared to 12 percent 
for the region on average. 
 
Data on the Sierra Leonean trade and production sectors is not robust enough to allow a 
detailed analysis of the trade and fiscal effects of an EPA. Landell Mills (2006, pp. 47) 
attempts to estimate the impact of an EPA by using Verdoorn’s (1960) partial equilibrium 
model per Busse et al. (2004) but conducting the analysis on the two-digit HS level 
instead of on the four-digit level, due to a lack of disaggregated data. The results from the 
simulations assume for the mid scenario that import duties will decrease by 32.6 percent, 
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corresponding to 15.2 percent of government revenue. Since no other studies on Sierra 
Leone are available the obtained results cannot be compared but it is worth noting that the 
fall in import duties is low compared to the estimates of Busse et al. for other West 
African countries. This estimate could be reasonable and could be explained by Sierra 
Leone’s relatively low share of EU imports. The estimate of revenue losses on the other 
hand is high and corresponds to estimates for countries that would expect to see declines 
of 60-80 percent in their import duties. An explanatory factor behind this result could be 
that Sierra Leone applies higher import-weighted tariffs on EU imports than the majority 
of West African countries. 
 
As a post-conflict country in the early stages of recovering, Sierra Leone’s fiscal system 
is to a large extent underdeveloped and The National Revenue Authority was only 
recently established (IMF, 2006, p. 15). Measures have been implemented to improve 
domestic revenue collection through revising agreements with private sector agents in 
order to improve competition. Preparations have been made to introduce a VAT on goods 
and services and steps have been taken to enhance transparency in revenue collection 
from the mining sector. For a country that is recovering from a decade of war, the 
adjustment to the revenue effects from the EPA could be particularly hard and the post-
conflict setting could be an obstacle to attracting foreign investment. 
 
5.3 Summary of the Case Study Predictions 
The case studies reviewed in the previous section use different methods for estimating the 
trade and the fiscal effects of an EPA. For that reason they are difficult to compare with 
each other and with the aggregate studies. Moreover, they make different assumptions on 
the scope and the transition period of liberalisation. Another reason to be cautious when 
interpreting these results is the limited reliability of national statistics in developing 
countries. 
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Table 7. Case Study Predictions of Revenue Loss under the West African EPA 
 
 
In general, in comparison to the study by Busse et al. (2004), the case studies estimate 
smaller revenue losses (see Table 7). What is more, the decline in import duties as a share 
of government revenue is for Sierra Leone and Guinea very large, losses of this size 
would imply a severe strain on their public finances. Overall, the evidence points to a 
significant negative impact for West African countries. The countries that are in the best 
position to handle these impacts are probably those with a strong fiscal system such as 
Senegal or countries that can expect to raise revenue from investment and growth in 
sectors processing valuable raw material. 
 
With regards to trade effects, the case studies do not focus particularly on these but EU 
imports can be expected to increase at the expense of imports from the rest of ECOWAS 
and the ROW. If EU suppliers replace intra-regional trade, it should be trade creating. 
However, in cases where the EU is potentially the most efficient supplier due to its 
producers being subsidised, West African producers are exposed to unfair competition 
preventing them from fully benefiting from their competitive advantage. This could be 
the case with, for example, rice, and for bovine and dairy products. When trade creation 
occurs, there will potentially be consumption effects as a result of consumers facing 
                                                  
5 Annual revenue loss in case study 
6 Own computation using data and estimates from case study 
7 Share of fiscal revenue 
8 Annual revenue loss under substantial and gradual, progressive liberalisation in case study 
  
Revenue loss as % 
of import duties 
 
Share of government 
revenue 
 
Country 
Case 
Studies 
Busse et 
al. 
Case 
Studies 
Busse et 
al. 
Burkina Faso5 11.86 46.8 2.76 5.6 
Gambia 33.0 65.0 15.4 21.9 
Guinea 78.06 51.6 12.4 4.9 
Mali 17.06 35.6 3.66 3.8 
Niger 47.2 29.6 14.07 3.6 
Nigeria 42.0 52.7 3.0 2.5 
Senegal 8 13.16 60.0 1.5 10.7 
Sierra Leone 32.6 - 15.0 - 
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lower prices. These effects will occur provided that exporters lower their prices in line 
with tariff eliminations and this will only happen if there is enough competition between 
suppliers. 
 
The EU is a major exporter of manufactured goods to West Africa, thus an increase in 
imports of these commodities can be expected under an EPA. This could have two 
consequences; firstly, consumers are likely to benefit from cheaper manufactured 
products which should spur growth and generate tax revenue in terms of VAT. Secondly 
local industries might not be able to survive and thus this will lead to unemployment 
which implies social and economic costs in the short to medium term. 
 
6 Conclusion 
The West African countries are at a crossroad at this point in time. The EPA offers a 
chance for West Africa to undertake major trade reform and to integrate into the world 
economy. Nonetheless, the EPA will imply severe challenges in terms of coping with 
fiscal revenue losses and the restructuring of economies. The time when countries could 
rely on tariffs as a main source of revenue has probably come to an end and the reform of 
protective trading regimes will have to occur at some point. 
 
The alternative to concluding the EPA is for the LDCs to continue to trade under the 
EBA preferences which offer them virtually the same access to European markets as 
under an EPA. However, these are unilaterally granted by the EU and can be withdrawn 
at any moment. If the LDCs are to definitely gain market access under an EPA, the final 
agreement must provide for elimination of non-tariff barriers such as more generous rules 
of origin and standardised SPS measures. The different incentives for West African 
countries to sign an EPA are reflected in their positions in the negotiations. Clearly, the 
non-LDCs are more likely to gain from an EPA than are the LDCs hence Ghana and Côte 
d’Ivoire did not hesitate to conclude interim agreements before the expiration of the 
Cotonou preferences. Nigeria on the other hand, uses its bargaining power from being a 
major oil exporter to try and exert pressure on the EU to extend its offer of providing 
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financial and technical assistance. Opting out of signing the interim EPA, Nigeria has 
indicated that it is not prepared to committing itself to trade liberalisation unless the EU 
offers substantial compensation in return. 
 
The West African countries are price takers on the world market when they export their 
agricultural commodities. The opening up of markets and the potential structural 
adjustment of the economies as a result of liberalisation could reverse this trend by 
allowing producers to differentiate their products and to take advantage of economies of 
scale. If the EPA is indeed to become a pro-development tool and bring dynamic gains in 
terms of investment, technology and production growth, the necessary infrastructure and 
institutions have to be in place. Otherwise these gains are unlikely to be realised for many 
years. The EU has so far indicated that it is willing to provide financial support regarding 
compensation for lost fiscal revenues but not to extend its support much further. 
 
As to the subject of revenue losses, empirical estimates of the impact of an EPA on fiscal 
revenues vary, but overall the evidence points to a significant negative impact for West 
African countries. The ability to absorb revenue losses will depend on how quickly 
countries can adapt their fiscal systems and shift to other sources of revenue. In post-
conflict countries like Sierra Leone and Guinea, where government institutions are weak 
and recently established, this transition will be particularly hard. Most West African 
countries are aware of the importance of increasing their reliance on indirect taxes and 
are currently implementing measures in order to reform their fiscal systems. However, it 
is doubtful whether the measures undertaken are sufficient to make up for the expected 
losses in tariff revenues. Corrupt institutions and large informal sectors are other reasons 
why broadening the fiscal base is likely to be problematic. Furthermore, it is important 
that the support the EU offers in terms of compensation for lost revenues is technical as 
well as financial. Otherwise there is a potential risk that countries do not undergo the 
necessary structural reform. 
 
Finally, one of the major development objectives of the EPAs is to promote deepened 
integration in the ACP regions. If trade is diverted from intra-ECOWAS suppliers in 
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favour of EU suppliers to a significant degree, the regional integration process in West 
Africa could be hampered as countries trade less with each other. For the same reason, a 
major increase in EU imports could inhibit South-South trade. 
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Appendix 1 Regional groupings in the ACP-EU EPA 
negotiations 
ECOWAS+ 
Mauritania ECCAS+STP ESA SADC group Caribbean Pacific 
Benin Cameroon Burundi Angola Antigua & Barbuda Cook Islands 
Burkina Faso Central African Rep Comoros Botswana Bahamas Fed Micronesia 
Cape Verde Chad Djibouti Lesotho Barbados Fiji 
Côte d'Ivoire Congo-Brazzaville Eritrea Mozambique Belize Kiribati 
Gambia D.R. Congo Ethiopia Namibia Dominica Marshall Islands 
Ghana Gabon Kenya Swaziland Dominican Rep Nauru 
Guinea S. Tomé, Principe Malawi South Africa Grenada Niue 
Guinea Bissau  Mauritius  Guyana Palau 
Liberia  Madagascar  Haiti Papua N Guinea 
Mali  Rwanda  Jamaica Samoa 
Mauritania  Seychelles  St. Lucia Solomon Islands 
Niger  Sudan  St Vincent Tonga 
Nigeria  Tanzania  St Christ. & Nevis Tuvalu 
Senegal  Uganda  Surinam Vanuatu 
Sierra Leone  Zambia  Trinidad & Tobago  
Togo  Zimbabwe    
      
 
Source: EC, 2006c 
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Appendix 2 West Africa EPA regional configuration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ECDPM, 2006 
